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Thursday, October 31, 2013

vested interest in kashmir

Opinion
The expansionist agenda
An unacknowledged vested interest in a disturbed Kashmir
By Firdaus Ahmed
http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=24632
That Kashmir remains disturbed suits several otherwise competing interests. Counter intuitively then, there is cooperation between these forces with stakes in Kashmir for keeping it simmering. While vested interests in the conflict are well known in certain quarters, such as for instance in the ISI and Jihad, Inc. across the border, this article deals with the less easy to find that are unfortunately much closer home and on that account are probably more significant. The thesis here is that north Indian ethnic groupshave developed an economic stake in the military's expansion, which makes them unwittingly amenable to continuing military commitment in Kashmir, mirroring in a manner the better known Punjabi-military nexus in Pakistan and its well recognised stake in a disturbed Kashmir. 

In the popular narrative, much furthered by army veterans, the army is merely doing a distasteful piece of work foisted on it by a hapless administration. It would much rather be in its cantonments in training for its primary task of guarding frontiers rather than manning an unforgiving Line of Control (LoC) and chasing down foreign jihadists and assorted Kashmiri nationalists. The inability of the diplomats of the two states to arrive at an agreement, minimally on a peaceable LoC and maximally on turning it into an IB, results in a military necessity of guarding it all along its often hostile length. Internally, the politicians and bureaucrats having messed up and unable to clean up thereafter results in the army's retaining of its hold despite in its view having created the security conditions enabling a political resolution. Therefore, it is not a 'vested interest' but is instead merely fulfilling its obligation. 

There is little to argue over the fact that the LoC continues to defy final settlement despite the passing of over half a century. It is also true that the security situation has been under enough control for most part of the preceding quarter century - not necessarily due to military means alone but also due to diplomatic and political measures - for India to have hammered out a political resolution. That it has not done so is not only due to a deficit in political strength, with Delhi perceiving, largely mistakenly, an inability to sell any 'solution' internally to the rest of the country. It also owes in part to the interests at play in Kashmir that have little to do with the conflict configuration but with dynamics elsewhere, including within the social composition of the security forces in general. 

The Kashmir problem has served as a windfall for uninhibited expansion of security forces. The momentary Khalistani insurgency of the eighties has brought home that changes in the social composition of the army, in particular, was necessary. Even as this was being proceeded with discreetly in terms of reduction of Sikh percentages within the military, there was an expansion in the army owing to its multiple counter insurgency commitments in the nineties ranging from the North East to Kashmir. Since the conventional deterrent needed to remain in place lest the proxy wars escalate inordinately, troop strength needed expanding. This necessity gave birth to the Rashtriya Rifles.

With Pakistan becoming more venturesome under its overt nuclear capability by its mounting of the Kargil misadventure and the parliament attack, further expansion was needed to be able to deliver it a quick, but not lethal, blow through what was termed the 'Cold Startdoctrine. The LoC fence that came up in the same timeframe also required more regular troops to man. Thus, another round of expansion took place of the army over last decade. China, and the latest 'two front' 'threat', provide a limitless rationale for expansion into the future, limited by the economics of it. 

While the army, a professional force that it is, can be expected to be cognisant of the strategic dimension informing, and in its view necessitating, its expansion, the issue is anchored not in the strategic coordinates as the army prefers to believe and the popular narrative would have it, but in the wider societal factors. In particular, the ethnic groups that have stood to be advantaged by such expansion are the ones propelling it. In the absence of statistics, these groups can be said to reside within a 100 km from the Jaipur-Delhi-Chandigarh-Jammu line. In the case of Kashmir, the advantaged groups are rather easy to spot. It is no wonder then that given a choice security force members would prefer postings in Kashmir rather than in the North East, positioned as they would be within a night's journey from their leave destinations. Therefore, a restive Kashmir as now - but not with a full blown insurgency as earlier - is not such a bad proposition. 

In the straitened times of liberalisation, the only sector that has expanded continuously is the security sector not only in terms of employment but also the monies devoted to it. These groups do not have the advantage of certain other Indian nationalities, such as those on the western sea board who can look towards the Gulf and certain others on the Deccan plateau and southwards who have leap-frogged on the back of the IT sector. Therefore, the security sector's expansion has enabled these groups to keep up. Additionally, the largesse of the Sixth Pay Commission has channelled a majority of army's revenue budget into their 'pinds and mohallas'. 

These groups are the ones that keep New Delhi frightened of its own shadow when it deals with Pakistan. With a collective memory marred by Partition, suffering a hangover of the martial race theory and influenced by cultural nationalism, these groups have a stake in continuation of an unacknowledged subcontinental civil war. This keeps them wary of Pakistan and at odds the liberal conception of security in which the alternative security approaches, such as prospects of economic engagement in diluting animosities and creating new power centres, are based. Therefore, even if India succeeds in forcing a penalty corner, for instance in entering into a dialogue with Pakistan, it is, quite like its hockey team, unable to convert it, in this case into a substantial and meaningful round of talks. 

Given this, it can in summation be said that the army is right in saying that it not yet another 'vested interest' in Kashmir; but only by its lights. As pointed out here, these lights are both narrow and dim. Expanding the theoretical template from military sociology to the 'military and society' plane helps identify more consequential vested interests that lie elsewhere. 

Identifying this is merely the first step. It begs the question: What's to be done? 

The national security question needs revisiting afresh. Challenging the popular trope, hung out to dry by veterans with Goebbelesian regularity in op-eds in the 'nationalist' press, is useful. But the intellectual battle also needs taking into the academia, the government's policy rooms and back rooms of political parties. Security has for too long been held hostage to 'strategic' thinking, fixated without. It requires instead a lens more sensitive to social and political forces within society. That way China and Pakistan would fall behind as 'threats' and instead forces, closer home, that unwittingly masquerade as 'answers' to security problems, would rise to claim their space. A redefinition of security will help India's peripheral population groups overthrow what in their perception might amount to an internal colonial yoke attributable as hypothesised here to its 'heartland' groups. 

(The author is a blogger at www.subcontinentalmusings.blogspot.in)
Opinion
The expansionist agenda
An unacknowledged vested interest in a disturbed Kashmir
By Firdaus Ahmed
That Kashmir remains disturbed suits several otherwise competing interests. Counter intuitively then, there is cooperation between these forces with stakes in Kashmir for keeping it simmering. While vested interests in the conflict are well known in certain quarters, such as for instance in the ISI and Jihad, Inc. across the border, this article deals with the less easy to find that are unfortunately much closer home and on that account are probably more significant. The thesis here is that north Indian ethnic groupshave developed an economic stake in the military's expansion, which makes them unwittingly amenable to continuing military commitment in Kashmir, mirroring in a manner the better known Punjabi-military nexus in Pakistan and its well recognised stake in a disturbed Kashmir. 

In the popular narrative, much furthered by army veterans, the army is merely doing a distasteful piece of work foisted on it by a hapless administration. It would much rather be in its cantonments in training for its primary task of guarding frontiers rather than manning an unforgiving Line of Control (LoC) and chasing down foreign jihadists and assorted Kashmiri nationalists. The inability of the diplomats of the two states to arrive at an agreement, minimally on a peaceable LoC and maximally on turning it into an IB, results in a military necessity of guarding it all along its often hostile length. Internally, the politicians and bureaucrats having messed up and unable to clean up thereafter results in the army's retaining of its hold despite in its view having created the security conditions enabling a political resolution. Therefore, it is not a 'vested interest' but is instead merely fulfilling its obligation. 

There is little to argue over the fact that the LoC continues to defy final settlement despite the passing of over half a century. It is also true that the security situation has been under enough control for most part of the preceding quarter century - not necessarily due to military means alone but also due to diplomatic and political measures - for India to have hammered out a political resolution. That it has not done so is not only due to a deficit in political strength, with Delhi perceiving, largely mistakenly, an inability to sell any 'solution' internally to the rest of the country. It also owes in part to the interests at play in Kashmir that have little to do with the conflict configuration but with dynamics elsewhere, including within the social composition of the security forces in general. 

The Kashmir problem has served as a windfall for uninhibited expansion of security forces. The momentary Khalistani insurgency of the eighties has brought home that changes in the social composition of the army, in particular, was necessary. Even as this was being proceeded with discreetly in terms of reduction of Sikh percentages within the military, there was an expansion in the army owing to its multiple counter insurgency commitments in the nineties ranging from the North East to Kashmir. Since the conventional deterrent needed to remain in place lest the proxy wars escalate inordinately, troop strength needed expanding. This necessity gave birth to the Rashtriya Rifles.

With Pakistan becoming more venturesome under its overt nuclear capability by its mounting of the Kargil misadventure and the parliament attack, further expansion was needed to be able to deliver it a quick, but not lethal, blow through what was termed the 'Cold Startdoctrine. The LoC fence that came up in the same timeframe also required more regular troops to man. Thus, another round of expansion took place of the army over last decade. China, and the latest 'two front' 'threat', provide a limitless rationale for expansion into the future, limited by the economics of it. 

While the army, a professional force that it is, can be expected to be cognisant of the strategic dimension informing, and in its view necessitating, its expansion, the issue is anchored not in the strategic coordinates as the army prefers to believe and the popular narrative would have it, but in the wider societal factors. In particular, the ethnic groups that have stood to be advantaged by such expansion are the ones propelling it. In the absence of statistics, these groups can be said to reside within a 100 km from the Jaipur-Delhi-Chandigarh-Jammu line. In the case of Kashmir, the advantaged groups are rather easy to spot. It is no wonder then that given a choice security force members would prefer postings in Kashmir rather than in the North East, positioned as they would be within a night's journey from their leave destinations. Therefore, a restive Kashmir as now - but not with a full blown insurgency as earlier - is not such a bad proposition. 

In the straitened times of liberalisation, the only sector that has expanded continuously is the security sector not only in terms of employment but also the monies devoted to it. These groups do not have the advantage of certain other Indian nationalities, such as those on the western sea board who can look towards the Gulf and certain others on the Deccan plateau and southwards who have leap-frogged on the back of the IT sector. Therefore, the security sector's expansion has enabled these groups to keep up. Additionally, the largesse of the Sixth Pay Commission has channelled a majority of army's revenue budget into their 'pinds and mohallas'. 

These groups are the ones that keep New Delhi frightened of its own shadow when it deals with Pakistan. With a collective memory marred by Partition, suffering a hangover of the martial race theory and influenced by cultural nationalism, these groups have a stake in continuation of an unacknowledged subcontinental civil war. This keeps them wary of Pakistan and at odds the liberal conception of security in which the alternative security approaches, such as prospects of economic engagement in diluting animosities and creating new power centres, are based. Therefore, even if India succeeds in forcing a penalty corner, for instance in entering into a dialogue with Pakistan, it is, quite like its hockey team, unable to convert it, in this case into a substantial and meaningful round of talks. 

Given this, it can in summation be said that the army is right in saying that it not yet another 'vested interest' in Kashmir; but only by its lights. As pointed out here, these lights are both narrow and dim. Expanding the theoretical template from military sociology to the 'military and society' plane helps identify more consequential vested interests that lie elsewhere. 

Identifying this is merely the first step. It begs the question: What's to be done? 

The national security question needs revisiting afresh. Challenging the popular trope, hung out to dry by veterans with Goebbelesian regularity in op-eds in the 'nationalist' press, is useful. But the intellectual battle also needs taking into the academia, the government's policy rooms and back rooms of political parties. Security has for too long been held hostage to 'strategic' thinking, fixated without. It requires instead a lens more sensitive to social and political forces within society. That way China and Pakistan would fall behind as 'threats' and instead forces, closer home, that unwittingly masquerade as 'answers' to security problems, would rise to claim their space. A redefinition of security will help India's peripheral population groups overthrow what in their perception might amount to an internal colonial yoke attributable as hypothesised here to its 'heartland' groups. 

(The author is a blogger at www.subcontinentalmusings.blogspot.in)

Saturday, October 19, 2013

affray in the ranks

ARMY CULTURE 
Soldiers, not servants 
http://www.indiatogether.org/2013/oct/fah-soldiers.htm
The army would like to point to low morale and push for higher pay. But as far as the troops are concerned, morale may have more to do with the way they are treated by officers, and this is what needs changing, writes Firdaus Ahmed. 
 

17 October 2013 - The last decade witnessed a spate of suicides and fratricides within the military. The pressures from counter insurgency over the preceding decade and a half were taking their toll. Measures put in place for prevention and response such as the suggestions of the Defence Institute for Psychological Research on the dignity of the soldier, and administrative measures as sending soldiers on their full leave entitlement three times a year, have reduced such incidents.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org http://www.indiatogether.org/2013/oct/fah-soldiers.htm

Six cases have been reported in the press of fisticuffs between officers and other ranks. The latest is the Meerut incident, involving a Delhi-based unit of a fighting regiment. Earlier incidents too involved combat units - an artillery unit in Nyoma and the armoured unit in Samba.
With the Seventh Pay Commission having been announced recently, the army can be expected to use its problem strategically to influence the outcome. 


The service will likely make the case that the 'root cause' of the cases of indiscipline is lack of officers in the frontlines. While other measures such as bettering leadership training, by introduction of a leadership course, and using the cadre of 91,000 junior commissioned officers optimally are reportedly in hand, the army will press for the Seventh Pay Commission to deliver not only for the personnel below officer ranks, but more so for officers.
The upshot of the organization using the issue of indiscipline in the ranks for feathering its institutional nest will be the continuing decline of professionalism in the service. Given the prospects of politicization currently staring the military in the face as the right wing forces vie for its tacit endorsement, mediated through the veterans' community, the two coincident and intertwined facets will ensure a degraded military capability by decade end, notwithstanding the armament acquisitions and higher technological thresholds in the pipeline.


The fact that the notable instances of indiscipline have been in fighting arms suggest that this is because the army attempts to maintain feudal privileges of the officer ranks by using troops to furnish the same. It is apparent that this is increasingly being resented by troops. The same problem has not been reported in technical and supporting arms and services, and this suggests that the relationship between officers and men in these is more work-oriented. This prevents any arbitrary behaviour on the part of officers, no doubt deterred in part by the higher standards of education of those in the other ranks. This is the case also in the air force and the navy, where work relations are work centric and not patriarchal.
Therefore, increasing the number of officers will only compound the problem since the weight of the officer class will increase. It can be argued that a higher remuneration to increase attractiveness of the service for youth will enhance quality of life, making the officer rely less on the service for privileges. This could reduce the pressure on the service to compensate officers for lack of remuneration with privileges.
The fact is that the Sixth Pay Commission did increase the pay and emoluments. Yet, the pressure on the army to compensate through provision of privileges for its officers has apparently not reduced appreciably. Even if it potentially could have, since the numbers of officers has gone up and inflation in the ranks due to a cadre review has made the army top-heavy over the past decade, those gains have been wiped out.
A cultural change is needed. This is clearly easier said than done since the military does not see itself any more in isolation from society, as a professional island in its cantonments and at remote fronts.
Firstly, the army would not likely reduce its officer privileges since it sees its peer group as the IAS and IPS. A statistic has it that in Maharashtra, 2600 cops work in the homes of the 280 IPS officers in the state. There are seven to ten constables, three to four orderlies, one cook and two or three telephone runners and two drivers each deployed at homes of superintendents and commissioners. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the case with army officers is not very different in kind even if the numbers involved are less odious. Not only are troops present in officer accommodation in cantonments but, more questionably, are also in their homes with officers' families when the officers are out on field postings.
Secondly, the feudal profile of fighting arms owes to the hangover of the martial race theory that has carried on into this century since its birth two centuries back through the regimental system. The recruiting continues to be caste based. For instance, the soldiers in the Sikh Light Infantry unit in question are from the lower castes in Punjab, while those from the Sikh Regiment are from higher castes. Such a recruiting profile leads to preponderance in representation of north Indian communities in the fighting arms. As a result their subcultures are imported into the army along with certain negative features as feudal, non-modern, relationships between those in power and authority and those in the ranks.
The army has closed its ranks against any change to this, even fighting off access to statistics involved, such as in the case of Sachar Committee inquiring after the numbers of the Muslims in the service. It can be expected that the advantaged communities, specifically those within a circle with a 300 km radius from Delhi, and their legions of veterans, will strengthen the army in its reactionary foot dragging. Increasing officer numbers will compound this problem, since the army will target these communities to deliver up more sons. These communities will in turn be more than forthcoming, making a vicious circle.
The problem in the ranks is deeper than the current assessments make it out to be. Cosmetic changes, taken with an eye to impress the Seventh Pay Commission, are in the offing, whereas a more proactive and holistic approach is required.
Firdaus Ahmed 
17 Oct 2013

Sunday, October 13, 2013

muslim underrepresentation in the military

Doing more with the military

Milligazette
1-15 September 2013

A leading military school in the country recently compiled the list of cadets that had entered its portals ever since it was founded pre-Independence. Of 2896 cadets that have entered its precincts since Independence, only 28 had Muslim names. You can do your maths; but the statistic bespeaks of several things. One is certainly that the odds appear to be stacked against our young boys for they perhaps not only do not know of such opportunities, but are also sloven in contesting for them and finally are unable to clear the admission tests. There are several reasons that can explain this away: poor if improving economic and literacy levels, low standards of schooling that prevents their being competitive and perhaps  opp
ortunities elsewhere such as in the Gulf, that keeps them away from chasing down such vacancies. However, the statistic also suggests the levels of engagement of the Muslim community with the security sector in the country.
In light of this it was heartening to read that 10 young lads from AMU have cleared the National Defence Academy test. This can be attributed in part to the leadership team in AMU comprising former military men: the VC and Registrar. It remains to be seen if this becomes a trend. If so it would increase the number of Muslim names on the merit lists that are usually scrutinised by some organisations with religious affiliation, including sometimes this publication (Milligazette), for the presence (and absence) of Muslims. While there is much ‘halla bulloo’ over Muslims cracking the civil services, such as the inspiring Kashmiri doctor topping the exam recently, those entering into the military and the security services, such as the paramilitary, receive less accolade. There is a case for a concerted attempt by the community to redress this under-representation.
The earlier explanations for lack of Muslim representation in the security services including the military, cannot work forever. Some of these such as the invidious suggestion that Muslims are ‘kept out’ due to some unacknowledged policy of covert discrimination does not merit serious attention. A fact needs acknowledging that the community has neglected this avenue of social mobility, economic opportunity and service to the wider nation. At Independence and soon thereafter, there was an exodus of the Muslim elite and middle classes for the ‘land of the pure’ and further westwards to the extent that curiously the largest community of South Asian language speakers in the US today comprises those speaking Urdu. Even if a proportion of these exited from Pakistan, a good number are former Indian Muslims, no doubt largely of ‘Ashraf’ lineage, who have abandoned their larger community that includes the ‘underclass’ of ‘Arzal’ and ‘Ajlaf’, for better climes. The next destination soon thereafter has been the Middle East, to which Indian Muslims have headed but only to be treated with mildly condescending tolerance. In effect, Indian Muslims have not focussed on opportunities that have been theirs for the taking in their neighbourhood – the ‘low hanging fruit’. Therefore, ‘Muslims keeping away’ better explains the speculative figure, not officially acknowledged, that there are about 29000 Muslims in the million-strong Indian Army.
Being frank about this can help redress the scale of underrepresentation. The onus is on the community to sign up for a life in uniform. There are several advantages in doing so. The foremost is that some of the largesse, that is indeed the defence budget amounting to over Rs 250 crores, will get channelled into Muslim homes. This has potential to lift economic indices of the community. An example is the density of Muslim servicemen and ex-servicemen in Jhunjhunu district of Rajasthan. They are considerably better off than most other Muslim communities. The advantages that  certain other communities, such as the Sikhs and mountain folk, that have lent their shoulder to the national security enterprise can then be shared more widely across the land.
Second, there is benefit for the security sector in that a greater representativeness is made possible by entry of Muslims in greater numbers. Knowledge and understanding occurs that translates as operation gains. This can be useful when, say, the Army is deployed in Kashmir or the paramilitary is deployed in Muslim majority areas. That ignorance fuels apprehension is well appreciated. With Muslim compatriots in their midst dispelling any negative ‘Muslim’ stereotype, the paramilitary and military would be more mature, restrained, in their response to violence.

Finally, the school list had the pre Independence era entries. The first 28 Muslim names on that list were among the first 100, implying that close to one third of the cadets were Muslims. From the number cadets with ‘Khan’ as surname it can be surmised that these belonged to the erstwhile ‘martial races’ in which the Pathan and Punjabi Musalman communities, now in Pakistan, were prominent. The fact is that today the figure has fallen to less than one-fiftieth of that. The martial race theory having been jettisoned along with colonialism, it is time that Muslims came out of the shadows of Partition. The fact remains that for some thousand years Muslims had a say in the security of the subcontinent. They have to gain a seat at the national security high table by dint of placing their sons in harm’s way. On a lighter note, from the over-representation of the community in prisons – reportedly at 19 per cent – for reasons not gone into here, it is clear that there is sufficient energy, initiative and courage in youngsters that can potentially be channelled into martial pursuit to the betterment of all – the individual, community and nation. 

military at the high table?

The Military At The High Table?

The military needs to be taken on board and its sense of alienation needs to be allayed to avoid its politicisation

General VK Singh, now retired for over a year, is fully within his rights to share the dais with a political personality of his choice. That he is energised by a grouse against the incumbent government for not granting him an extension is plausible. Additionally, it has been reckoned by watchful security commentators that this has come to pass as yet another episode in the sorry civil war on in South Block between the brass and the bureaucrats.
The perception is that national security structures are so awry that the security prescription of the  is not taken on board. Further,  veterans have been kept from receiving their due in the form of ‘one rank one pay’ by a heartless bureaucracy. Given their perceived marginalisation, veterans are courting the opposition that in turn wants their endorsement to best the ruling party at the forthcoming polls. This could lead to politicisation of the  due to an existing beltway of intellectual and cultural traffic between the veteran community and the.
The argument begs the question: Is the  really outside the defence policy loop? From the army’s stonewalling on the issue of AFSPA in the Northeast and in J&K and on Siachen, it would appear that not only does it have a voice, but also a veto. A defence budget of over Rs 250 thousand crores spells that the  has the outlay it could possibly bid for. This suggests that even if the  is not sitting on the table, its position has not been ignored; perhaps because it cannot be ignored. So what more can the  really want?
The ’s acquisitions suggest that all that is demanded by its doctrine is being met. All it can possibly ask for additionally is a chance at working the doctrine in practice when terrorist push comes to conventional shove. This is a policy decision that the government keeps the  out of, reserving the policy choice and decision space for itself.
This is unexceptionable since the  is only a tool and the government is the one empowered to use it or not as per its rationale. At best the  can input such a decision but it cannot arrogate the decision for itself or demand that it be as per its lights. The government fears that it may be stampeded into decisions it could come to regret, overawed by the argument and stature of the  professional. It may require arguing its case against that of the , which in the circumstance of a conflict, would put it in a less favourable position. The upshot could well be a decision based on  logic rather than the overriding political logic.
While in theory the political coordinates of a conflict situation must supersede the perspective, in practice this may not happen. Firstly, a government would be shy of going against professional advice. Any government would hate to have a national security decision labelled as politically motivated out of parochial ends. The usual scepticism with which political actions are greeted in the country, it would be difficult for a government to persuade the people that it was acting on the political compulsions of the situation rather than thinking of its own longevity.
Secondly, the ’s input need not always be professional. While the  is apolitical, it has corporate interests that influence its input. It does exert for having its perspective heard, sometimes using indirect pressure on decision makers by manipulating public opinion. For this purpose it has a two-star headed public information cell and is increasingly resorting to the  intelligence directorate.
General VK Singh’s revelations on the army making payments to politicians in J&K must be seen in this light. The leaked on the internal inquiry of the doings of the now defunct  intelligence outfit, the Technical Support Division, during VK Singh’s tenure allege that a bid to topple the J&K government was also on the cards during the troubles in 2010.
It is for these reasons that the  is only invited to participate in relevant decisions, rather than figuring in the National Security Council organogram. The service chiefs though part of the strategic planning group along with the secretaries of relevant ministries, feel that, due to this clubbing with bureaucrats, their input is stifled.
They also perhaps have reservations on retired three star officers as advisers in the secretariat. This arrangement harks back to the Curzon-Kitchener controversy, with Kitchener objecting to his security input being second guessed by a serving major general in the viceroy’s council. As a result, the  is wary of ending up implementing decisions it is not party to.
There is danger in neglecting this structural deficit further. Yet a bigger problem is in the political moves of the veteran community that can be read as another indirect attempt by the uniformed fraternity to press for change. Such moves prove the point that the  is a political player that can skew decisions that are essentially political. The  at the high table is a greater danger, especially one that is a political player.
On this count, there is a case for keeping the  alongside in the room, rather than outside it or on the high table. If General VK Singh’s latest controversy is to have something positive come of it, then innovation on these lines is it.
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